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Abstract
This paper analyses the optimal wage contract when firms face demand un-
certainty and workers care about employment stability. Workers choose the firm
that oﬀers the highest utility taking into account the future lay-oﬀ probabili-
ties; firms choose the wage contract that maximises the residual share of the
gains from production. For risk-neutral workers this occurs with any eﬃcient
wage contract so long as it matches the ex-ante outside option of the workers,
i.e. all feasible eﬃcient contracts are optimal. The feasibility is proved for the
eﬃcient profit-sharing case. For risk-averse workers with variable eﬀort supply,
profit-sharing contracts are further shown to provide eﬀort incentives through
both their eﬃciency wage and performance-related payout eﬀects. The paper
thus promotes profit-sharing contracts not only on the grounds of employment
stability, but also on the basis of its eﬃciency and incentive eﬀects.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the optimal wage contract when firms face product market
demand uncertainty and workers care about employment stability. The motivation
for the paper comes from my personal experience of working for a large Japanese
bank in the 1990s. There our wage contracts were, at least to our understanding, of a
profit-sharing form. On the other hand foreign firms competing for the same workers
were oﬀering (higher) fixed-wage contracts. These oﬀered no employment guarantee,
as opposed to the Japanese firms who, although not explicitly so contracted, were of-
fering a more stable if not a long-term employment environment. The profit-sharing
literature spearheaded by Weitzman (1984) explains to great extent this relationship
between the form of wage contract and the resulting degree of employment stability.
However the question tackled here is whether one form of contract dominates others
for profit-maximising firms when they compete for workers, bearing in mind the gen-
erally accepted view that at least up until recently, and possibly even now, firms in
the two largest economies in the world - the US and Japan - oﬀer broadly speaking
very diﬀerent forms of wage and employment contracts.
The model set-up of this paper is then briefly as follows. Facing diﬀerent wage
contracts oﬀered, the workers, who are initially assumed risk-neutral, choose the firm
that oﬀers the highest expected wage income taking into account the probability of
being laid-oﬀ. There is cost in being laid-oﬀ which is the time spent in unemployment,
during which time firms compete for workers and the wages adjust to clear the market.
In this paper this process is represented by a single-period framework in which all
workers are matched to a firm at the beginning of the period ex-ante of product market
shocks, but some are laid-oﬀ if the realised shock turns out to be negative. A new
phase of labour market competition then begins but due to co-ordination problems it
takes a whole period for the workers to be fully matched again. Meanwhile production
occurs. Firms compete for workers by oﬀering shares of expected surplus gain from
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production. In equilibrium all workers receive the same pre-shock expected surplus
transfer irrespective of the chosen wage contract, and the firms choose the wage
contract that provides them with the highest residual share of surplus. This defines
the optimal wage contract.
Given a realised market demand then, a firm creates the maximum surplus gain
from production when it chooses its output level where the marginal revenue of labour
equals its opportunity cost, which in this paper is the unemployment benefit. This
defines eﬃciency. The question is whether a given eﬃcient wage contract is able
to provide a high enough expected wage income to match the outside option of the
workers in the labour market. This is the question of feasibility. For example if
workers have any positive bargaining power (i.e. workers are better oﬀ being in work
than unemployed), then the eﬃcient fixed wage contract which simply pays the wage
equal to the unemployment benefit, is clearly not feasible. Or conversely, a feasible
fixed wage contract is not eﬃcient. How about then if we introduce a profit-sharing
component and trade-oﬀ the fixed-wage component for a higher profit-share? Can
we successfully bring the fixed-wage component down to the eﬃcient level without
making the workers worse oﬀ? The answer to this is not immediately obvious as
a decrease in the fixed-wage, which is the marginal cost of labour, has opposing
eﬀects on the expected income of a decreased wage level and increased employment
stability. The paper however succeeds in showing that the eﬃcient profit-sharing
contract is indeed feasible. The proof is an application of the Envelope Theorem.
Moreover it is shown more generally that for risk-neutral workers, any feasible eﬃcient
contracts are optimal in the set of all linear contracts. As eﬃciency implies higher
employment, this means that facing product market demand uncertainty, firms will
optimally choose to oﬀer greater employment stability, without requiring any formal
employment commitment.
The analysis is then extended to risk-averse workers. The feasibility of the eﬃcient
profit-sharing contract is shown to be preserved. However the optimality is not, as
the optimal wage contract is determined by a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and risk-
sharing. This suggests that a full-insurance wage contract, where the workers receive
3
the same fixed income in or out of work, is the optimal wage contract. However when
variable eﬀort supply is introduced, and when the eﬀort exertion is costly, then some
level of income variance is required to induce workers to exert higher eﬀort. There
are two ways of achieving this: by making unemployment costly, as argued by the
eﬃciency wage literature initiated by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and by making the
remuneration performance related, as widely established by the incentives literature
such as Salanié (1997). The model here allows me to show that the profit-sharing
contracts provide both these incentive eﬀects, and the optimal contract would be the
one with the optimal trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency, risk-sharing and incentives. The
paper thus promotes the use of profit-sharing contracts not only on the grounds of
employment stability, from the workers’ point of view as is traditionally argued in the
literature (e.g. Weitzman (1984)), but also on the basis of its eﬃciency and incentive
eﬀects, from the view point of the firms.
Empirical studies suggests that there are regional diﬀerences for the evidences
of the use of profit-share. For example Weitzman (1995) lists Japan, Korea and
Taiwan as countries where profit-sharing contracts are oﬀered. He cites studies such
as Freeman and Weitzman (1987) who find that in Japan bonuses paid twice a year
constitute about 25 percent of an average worker’s total pay, with the bonus-to-
base-wage ratio statistically significantly correlated with profitability. My personal
experience with my bank was closer to a third. Kim (1988), also quoted in Weitzman
(1995), finds similar evidence for Korea. In contrast for the West, both Pendleton,
Poutsma, van Ommeren and Brewster (2001) and Poutsma (2003) show, based on
surveys in the 1990s, that less than 20% of firms in the UK or the EU employ profit-
sharing schemes for more than 50% of their workers. This paper limits its analysis to
the optimal wage contract under product market demand uncertainty. An extension
of the model to further include production uncertainty may explain the observed
regional diﬀerences. What the paper does is to contribute to the study of optimal wage
contracts under uncertainty by developing a simple but comprehensive framework for
analysing wage contract determination in a competitive labour market, and in doing
so providing a firmer microeconomic analytical basis for the wage theories, especially
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that of profit-share.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a single-period model of
labour market competition with demand uncertainty for risk-neutral workers. It es-
tablishes the concept of feasibility, and analyses both the first-best and the second-best
outcomes. Section 3 extends the analysis to risk-averse workers, and investigates both
cases of fixed and variable eﬀort supply. Section 4 then gives concluding remarks.
2 Risk-Neutral Workers and Feasible Wage Contracts
2.1 The Model
An economy consists of homogeneous and infinitely-lived firms and workers. To begin
with all agents are assume risk-neutral. As with Weitzman (1985) the firms are
thought of as ‘competitive monopolists’ where a large number of firms operate in
individual diﬀerentiated product markets. The revenue functions R = py are assumed
to be concave, where p ≡ p(y) is the market price, y ≡ y(N) is the firms’ production
function, and N is the number of employees. To begin with the worker eﬀort supply
is assumed fixed. The firms face idiosyncratic uncertainty in their market demand
which is represented by a multiplicative parameter φ, such that the stochastic market
price for the output goods equals φp. φ is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed both intertemporally and between the product markets, with φ ∈ [0,∞]
and E[φ] = 1. Its probability density function f(φ) is known by both the firm and
the workers. In this paper I assume no production uncertainty in the worker output.
The firms compete for workers in the labour market. The labour market clears,
but because of co-ordination problems due to reasons such as geographical distances
or costly search for information, it is not immediate. Therefore once the shocks hit
the firms start adjusting their employment levels, but while firing workers is instan-
taneous, hiring them takes time. Meanwhile production occurs. The workers in the
labour market are then matched to the firms at the point of market clearance, after
which the whole cycle repeats. Thus unlike in the frictional labour market literature
(e.g. Pissarides (2000)), where the labour market does not clear and the wages are
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Figure 1: Single-Period Production and Labour Market Process
determined by Nash bargaining of rents from job matches, here wages do clear the job
matching market, but only in expectation of future product market demand shocks.
Note that a job match does not guarantee a paid wage as if the demand shock turns
out to be negative then some of the newly matched workers may be released before
production occurs. However job-parting is random in the sense that both existing and
new workers have the equal probability of being released. The released workers are
assumed to remain unemployed for the whole of the production period, during which
time they earn an out-of-work income of wout. This is the workers’ ex-post outside
option, and can be thought of as the unemployment benefit provided by the state.
The wage contract is then determined in the market-clearing process as firms
compete for workers. While post-shock employment is not guaranteed, the firms
are committed to the oﬀered wage contracts during the production period. The
workers choose the firm that oﬀers the highest expected utility taking into account
employment stability. For risk-neutral workers this is the expected income given the
probabilities of remaining in-work for each realised shocks. This defines the workers’
ex-ante outside option. The pre-shock labour market competition results in a partial
transfer of the expected gains of production from the firms to the workers. The ex-
ante outside option is therefore higher than the ex-post one. In equilibrium all firms
oﬀer the same ex-ante utility, irrespective of the wage contract chosen.
The set-up here is then a simplified single-period representation of a clearing
labour market with uncertainty. In reality firms and workers are in a continuous
process of job-match, with the wage adjustments leading the labour market in the
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direction of market clearance, but with the process being aﬀected by random shocks
that destroy jobs including those that are in the process of being filled. The simpli-
fication allows me to capture the eﬀects of employment stability on the choice of the
wage contract in a comprehensible way. Intuitively this framework is comparable to
that of Weitzman (1985), whose main analysis is a comparison of the short-run out-
comes of two diﬀerent wage contracts - fixed wage and profit-sharing - when negative
shocks hit the long-run full employment equilibria.
I will now formalise this. The cycle of pre-shock job-matching and post-shock
production for firm i is modelled as follows,
Stage 2: Post-shock N adjustment Given realised product market demand shock
φi and the wage contract wi that may or may not depend on φi and/or Ni, firm
i maximises its profit π(wi, φi) with respect to Ni(φi),
max
Ni
π(wi, φi) = φiR(Ni)− wiNi (1)
subject to the frictional labour market constraint,
Ni(φi) ≤ N ci (2)
where Nci is the pre-shock market-clearing employment level. The maximum
value function is then given by π∗(wi, φi).
Stage 1: Pre-shock wage determination The firm chooses the wage contract wi
to maximise its expected profit level Eπ,
max
wi
Eπ(wi) =
Z ∞
0
π∗(wi, φ)f(φ)dφ (3)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator over φ, subject to a partici-
pation constraint,
Ew(wi) =
Z ∞
0
ENwi f(φ)dφ ≥ max
1≤j≤M
Ew(wj) (PC1)
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where M is the total number of firms, and ENwi is the post-shock but pre-
employment adjustment expected income for a worker in firm i with a contract
wi when the state of nature turns out to be φi,
ENwi =
µ
Ni(φ)
N ci
¶
wi +
µ
1− Ni(φ)
Nci
¶
wout (4)
EN is the mathematical expectation taken over the Bernoulli distribution with
probabilities
n
Ni(φ)
Nci
, 1− Ni(φ)Nci
o
. In equilibrium all firms oﬀer the same Ew
irrespective of their chosen wage contract wj . This defines the workers’ ex-ante
outside option, which is denoted by Ewres. It reflects the supply condition of
the labour market, which is taken as exogenous.
Pre-shock Market Clearance Firms compete for workers until all workers are
matched to a firm pre-shock,
{wj}j=1,...,M such that
MX
j=1
N cj (wj) = N (5)
where N = total workforce in the economy.
2.2 First-Best Analysis
I begin by describing the first-best outcome for this problem where there is no un-
certainty. The market demands {φi}i=1,...,M are therefore known prior to the labour
market competition. The optimal outcome is then when the aggregate pay-oﬀs of the
firm, workers in-work and the unemployed are maximised,
max
{Ni}
MX
i=1
{φiR(Ni)−wiNi}+
MX
i=1
wiNi + wout
Ã
N −
MX
i=1
Ni
!
=
MX
i=1
{φiR(Ni)− woutNi}+ woutN
i.e. the workers are allocated amongst the firms in such a way as to maximise the
aggregate surplus gain from production. This occurs when the marginal revenue φiR0
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equals the opportunity cost of labour wout for all i. This then defines the concept of
eﬃciency for a wage contract w(x) with its wage parameters x,
Definition 1 Given a wage contract w(x), the contract w(xe) is eﬃcient if it gen-
erates the first-best surplus gain from production given the product market demand
shock φi.
Immediately then for a class of linear wage contracts, an eﬃcient wage contract
must have the fixed-wage component equal to the opportunity cost of labour wout.
The general form of an eﬃcient linear wage contract is then,
wi = wout + sikTi
where Ti is a lump-sum transfer of surplus from the firms to the workers in a form
that does not aﬀect the firm’s employment decision, and sik is the worker k’s share
of it in firm i such that
P
k sik = 1. If the firms have the full bargaining power over
the workers then this lump-sum transfer would be zero. Assuming that competition
for workers leads to a positive surplus transfer, examples of such transfers are,
1. Ti = B, a fixed aggregate-bonus payout irrespective of φi.
2. Ti = λ (φiR− woutN) where λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e. a profit-sharing scheme.
3. Any combination of the two, such as Ti = min [φiR− woutN, B].
Now assuming that in equilibrium all firms oﬀer the same wage contract wi = w,
for the rest of the paper the subscripts i are suppressed for notational brevity.
2.3 Second-Best Analysis
Let Ω be the set of all linear wage contracts, and ω ⊂ Ω be the set of a particular
form of linear contracts, such as fixed wages or profit-sharing contracts. I begin by
defining the concepts of optimality and feasibility,
Definition 2 A wage contract w(x) is optimal at x∗ under given constraints if it
generates the maximum surplus gain for the firm.
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For example if the constraint is the form of the wage contract w(x) ∈ ω, then w(x∗)
is the contract with the parameters that provide the risk-neutral firm with the highest
pre-shock expected profit Eπ. If on the other hand the referred wage contracts are
all contracts w(x) ∈ Ω, then the contract w∗(x∗) that leads to the maximum possible
expected profit is the optimal wage contract in the set of all contracts.
Definition 3 A wage contract w(x) is feasible at x if the desired level of worker
expected utility can be attained at x.
Take for example the market-clearing expected wage level for risk-neutral workers
Ewres. Then immediately one can see that in a labour market where workers have
positive bargaining power (i.e. they demand surplus above the ex-post outside op-
tion wout), the eﬃcient fixed wage contract w = wout is not feasible. Or putting it
conversely, feasible fixed wage contracts w = F are not eﬃcient.
To get a better idea of the feasibility concept, I begin the second-best analysis by
considering the following profit-sharing contract as formulated by Weitzman (1985),
w(F, λ) = F + λ
µ
φR− FN
N
¶
(6)
where F is a fixed-wage, and λ is as before the workers’ share of the firm’s aggregate
profit φR − FN for the particular state of nature φ. This is assumed to be shared
equally between the N workers. In the extreme case that λ = 0 this becomes the
fixed wage contract. Now it is not immediately obvious that the eﬃcient profit-sharing
contract is feasible. To see this start with the feasible fixed wage contract w(F, 0)
where F > wout, and consider what happens when the profit-share ratio is increased
to λ > 0. For eﬃciency what we desire is for F to start reducing towards wout as
λ increases, while keeping the worker utility level the same. This trade-oﬀ would be
viable if increases in λ and F were both beneficial to the workers. For λ this is clear
as, ceteris paribas, an increase in the profit-share increases a worker’s wage level while
not aﬀecting his employment, i.e. ∂Ew∂λ > 0. On the other hand when F increases,
while it raises the wage level in work, it also aﬀects the firm’s post-shock employment
decision and decreases the probability of the worker remaining in work. Therefore the
10
sign of the net eﬀect dEwdF =
∂Ew
∂F + E
h
dN
dF
∂ENw
∂N
i
is ambiguous, and hence so is the
sign of dFdλ , which for a successful trade-oﬀ must be negative. Here however follows
an argument that the trade-oﬀ is in fact possible unambiguously, and hence a feasible
eﬃcient profit-sharing contract exists,
Proposition 1 The eﬃcient profit-sharing contract is feasible. Moreover for risk-
neutral workers, the contract is optimal.
Proof. To see this, solve the problem outlined in Section 2.1 for the profit-sharing
contract (6). First consider the post-shock employment adjustment in Stage 2. By
substituting the profit-sharing contract (6) in (1), the post-shock profit is given by,
π(F, λ, φ) = (1− λ) {φR(N)− FN} (7)
The employment level N(φ) is then given by the conditions
R0(N(φ)) =
F
φ
, φ ≤ 1 (8)
N(φ) = N c , φ > 1
Therefore the adjusted employment level N(φ) depends on λ only insofar as it af-
fects the equilibrium fixed-wage component F through participation constraint (PC1).
Next consider Stage 1. The eﬀect of a change in λ on Eπ is given by,
dEπ
dλ
=
∂Eπ
∂λ
+
dF
dλ
µ
∂Eπ
∂F
+E
∙
dN(φ)
dF
∂π∗
∂N
¸¶
= − Eπ
1− λ − (1− λ)N
dF
dλ
(9)
where I have used the Envelope Theorem to eliminate ∂π
∗
∂N = 0, and N is the average
number of employees
N =
Z ∞
0
N(φ)f(φ)dφ (10)
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Similarly the participation constraint (PC1) implies that,
dEw
dλ
=
∂Ew
∂λ
+
dF
dλ
µ
∂Ew
∂F
+E
∙
dN(φ)
dF
∂ENw
∂N
¸¶
(11)
=
1
N c
Eπ
1− λ +
1
N c
dF
dλ
n
(1− λ)N +∆N 0
o
(12)
where ∆ is the extra income from the fixed-wage component when in work
∆ = F −wout (13)
and N 0 is the average change in employment level
N 0 =
Z ∞
0
∂N
∂F
f(φ)dφ (14)
This we know to be negative from the conditions (8) and the concavity of R(N). As
for whatever values of λ, F must adjust to provide the outside option Ewres, (12)
must equal zero and hence in combining with (9) we have,
dEπ
dλ
= ∆N 0
dF
dλ
(15)
Now to prove the feasibility of the eﬃcient profit-sharing contract I require dFdλ to
be negative. Using (11) this is,
dF
dλ
= − ∂Ew
∂λ
Á
dEw
dF
(16)
where from (12) the derivatives are,
∂Ew
∂λ
=
1
N c
Eπ
1− λ (17)
dEw
dF
=
1
N c
n
(1− λ)N +∆N 0
o
(18)
As expected ∂Ew∂λ is unambiguously positive while
dEw
dF is a sum of positive and neg-
ative terms. It is only when the net eﬀect of the latter is positive that the workers
12
   Ew 
                         
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
                        
   wout 
 
      0                   
C A B
λ > 0
λ = 0
Ew=Ewres× ×× ×
wout F
Figure 2: Ew vs. F for diﬀerent values of λ
will be willing to trade-oﬀ the two components F and λ. However we can show that
this is indeed the case unambiguously. First rewrite Ew in (PC1) as,
Ew(F ) = ∆
N
N c
+
λ
N c
Z ∞
0
(φR− FN) f(φ)dφ+ wout (19)
I denote Ew with the argument F to remind ourselves that we are considering the
Ew curve with respect to F , for given values of λ. What we want to investigate is
the slope of this, at values of F where Ew equals the given reservation income Ewres,
which I call the participation constraint solutions. So first consider the extreme values
of Ew(F ). For the fixed-wage contract λ = 0,
Ew(F ) = ∆
N
N c
+wout
⎧
⎨
⎩
= wout at F = wout
→ wout as F →∞
The latter states that for F very large where N decreases to zero, Ew(∞) in (19)
asymptotically approaches wout from above. This is in fact true for all values of
λ < 1. Next consider the slope of Ew. At F = wout, dEwdF in (18) is unambiguously
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positive for all values of λ. As F increases and thus N decreases, the first term of
(18) decreases while the second term becomes negative, turning dEwdF negative at some
point. Finally ∂Ew∂λ > 0 for any given F in (17) means that the curve shifts upwards as
λ increases. Therefore the curves Ew(F ) look as depicted in Figure 2. The potential
participation constraint solutions are then where the horizontal line Ewres crosses the
Ew(F ) curves, which for fixed-wage contract λ = 0 there are two possibilities: A and
B in Figure 2. However the firm will always choose to operate at the lower value of
F (i.e. at A, the feasible fixed-wage contract) as for a given λ, dEπdF < 0 (c.f. (7)).
Therefore for λ = 0 the firm will operate at the upward-sloping part of the Ew(F )
curve where dEwdF > 0.
For the eﬃcient profit-sharing contract the curve that we are interested is the one
where λ has risen enough such that the participation constraint solution has shifted
down from A to C, i.e. where F = wout. We know that the slope dEπdF is still positive
from (18) when F = wout. It thus follows that for the eﬃcient contract, dFdλ in (12)
is negative, and the workers are happy to accept lower fixed-wage component for a
higher profit-share, i.e. it is feasible. The optimality of this contract then directly
follows from (15).
The optimality implies that with risk-neutral workers, firms will choose to oﬀer
a strictly positive profit-sharing contract as opposed to a fixed-wage contract. This
is really an application of the Envelope Theorem. Any changes in F or λ are, in
absolute wage level terms, simply surplus transfers between the firm and the workers.
However a decrease in F has an additional eﬀect for workers of increased employment
stability. For the firm though the marginal eﬀect of this on the ex-post maximised
profit level is zero (c.f. (1)). Hence the firm is able to generate higher surplus gain
(equalling the employment stability eﬀect) by reducing F and increasing λ, until F
is driven down to wout. This is then an example of a wage contract where firms
optimally choose to oﬀer greater employment stability, without requiring any formal
employment commitment by the firm.
Now it follows from Proposition 1 that, where Weitzman (1985) states that he does
not have “a formal theory that would explain ... why a society chooses a particular
14
[profit-sharing] configuration...”, I can derive an explicit expression for the optimal
profit-share parameter for risk-neutral workers,
Corollary 1 For risk-neutral workers, the optimal profit-share ratio is given by
λ∗ =
(Ewres − wout)N cR∞
0 (φR− woutN) f(φ)dφ
(20)
Proof. This follows directly from (19) where λ∗ is the value of λ at which Ew
equals Ewres.
Furthermore,
Corollary 2 Full employment is achieved when wout = 0.
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that with wout = 0, λ∗ will be at the point where
F is driven down to 0 (i.e. a pure profit-share contract). At this point the first-order
condition (8) for the profit function implies that for all values of φ, the firm will wish
to employ the maximum possible employment level, i.e. N c. Thus full employment
is achieved regardless of the fluctuations in the market demand.
The full employment profit-share ratio is then (20) when wout = 0, i.e.,1
λ∗ =
EwresN c
R (N c)
(21)
We can now generalise the optimality result to all linear wage contracts,
Proposition 2 For risk-neutral workers, given a set of wage contracts ω, if an eﬃ-
cient contract w(xe) ∈ ω is feasible, it is also optimal in ω.
Proof. Given a wage contract w(x) ∈ ω, the optimal wage contract w(x∗) for
risk-neutral workers is one which maximises the following expected profit,
Eπ =
Z ∞
0
(φR− woutN) f(φ)dφ− (Ew − wout)N c such that Ew = Ewres (22)
1This in fact follows from the fact that in full employment, Ew = λR(N
c)
Nc .
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This equation states that the firm’s share of surplus gain from production is net of
payments Ewres − wout to all N c matched workers, and an additional wout to those
that remain in work post-shock. The parameters x are chosen so as to maximise this.
The feasibility condition asks whether the wage contract permits the market-clearing
expected income Ew = Ewres at the eﬃcient parameters xe. For profit-sharing
contracts, the analysis of Proposition 1 established the F − λ trade-oﬀ that allows
this. If this is the case then dEwdx = 0, and the maximisation solution is given by,
dEπ
dx
=
Z ∞
0
dN
dx
d
dN
(φR− woutN)f(φ)dφ = 0 (23)
A suﬃcient condition for this to be true is that ddN (φR − woutN) = 0 for all φ, i.e.
that the wage contract is eﬃcient. Thus given a set of wage contracts ω, the eﬃcient
wage contract is also the optimal wage contract in ω.
It further follows that,
Proposition 3 For risk-neutral workers, any feasible eﬃcient wage contract is opti-
mal in the set of all wage contracts Ω.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 2: eﬃcient wage contracts maximise
the expected profit level Eπ in (22), but (22) is independent of the choice of the wage
contract so long as it is feasible.
By definition any eﬃcient wage contract produces the maximum possible surplus
gain from production. The labour market competition determines how much of this
surplus is transferred to the workers. Then so long as this transfer is possible without
aﬀecting the firm’s post-shock employment decision (i.e. the wage contract is feasible),
the firm is left with the maximum residual surplus gain regardless of its choice of the
eﬃcient contract. It follows then that the optimal profit-sharing contract is also
optimal in the set of all contracts, but so is, for example, the following eﬃcient fixed
aggregate-bonus contract,
w(φ) = wout +
B
N(φ)
(24)
An analogous argument to Proposition 1 would show that this contract is also feasible.
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3 Extension to Risk-Averse Workers
3.1 Fixed Eﬀort Supply
I now extend the analysis to that with risk-averse workers. The worker eﬀort level
is still assumed fixed. In contrast to the risk-neutral case where workers’ utility
was represented by their expected income, risk-averse workers have concave utility
functions. For the purpose of analysis then I assume an exponential utility function
U(w) = −e−rw for an income w, with the constant absolute risk-aversion parameter
r. The expected utility is then given by,
EU = −
Z ∞
0
½µ
N(φ)
Nc
¶
e−rw +
µ
1− N(φ)
N c
¶
e−rwout
¾
f(φ)dφ (25)
This time then the reservation utility, which is again the maximum utility oﬀered
by firms in the labour market competition, is denoted by EUres. The participation
constraint for the risk-averse workers is then,
EU(wi) ≥ max
1≤j≤J
EU(wj) = EUres (PC2)
As with risk-neutral workers, I first investigate the feasibility and the optimality of
the eﬃcient profit-sharing contract,
Proposition 4 If a feasible fixed-wage contract exists, then the eﬃcient profit-sharing
contract is feasible. However for risk-averse workers it is not optimal.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that given for Proposition 1. To prove feasibility,
I once again show that the sign of dFdλ is negative. This is given in Appendix A.
To prove non-optimality of the eﬃcient profit-sharing contract, I use the certainty
equivalent representation of the expected utility which is given by (see for example
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) Ch7),
CE = Ew − r
2
V ar[w] (26)
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where Ew is defined by (PC1) and (4), and the variance term is given by,
V ar[w] =
Z ∞
0
½µ
N(φ)
N c
¶
(w −Ew)2 +
µ
1− N(φ)
N c
¶
(wout −Ew)2
¾
f(φ)dφ (27)
The binding participation constraint implies then that dCEdλ =
dEw
dλ −
r
2
dV ar[w]
dλ = 0,
which is using (12),
1
Nc
Eπ
1− λ +
N
N c
dF
dλ
n
(1− λ)N +∆N 0
o
− r
2
dV ar[w]
dλ
= 0 (28)
Combining this with dEπdλ given in (9) the analogous equation to (15) is then,
dEπ
dλ
= ∆N 0
dF
dλ
− r
2
N c
dV ar[w]
dλ
(29)
In comparison to (15), for risk-averse workers there is an additional eﬀect of an in-
crease in λ on the wage income variance. The sign of dV ar[w]dλ needs a little discussion.
A mathematical analysis is outlined in Appendix B. The wage income variance V ar[w]
comes from two sources as the market demand shock φ fluctuates: the variance of
the in-work wage w itself, and the dispersion of w from wout, the income when out-
of-work. Clearly an increase in λ increases the in-work wage variance as the size of
the variable part of the wage increases. However we know that this increase in λ has
a secondary eﬀect of a fall in F , which reduces the level of w and hence its dispersion
from wout. Therefore this eﬀect alone has a reducing eﬀect on V ar[w]. There are
further tertiary eﬀects of an increase in employment level N(φ) (as a result of the fall
in F ), both decreasing the in-work wage variance as it reduces the share of the ag-
gregate profit, and increasing the dispersion from wout from the increased probability
of being paid the higher in-work wage. The result of my argument in Appendix B
is that the overall sign of dV ar[w]dλ is positive at F = wout. Then the solution to (29)
equals zero occurs at the profit-sharing ratio λ∗ where ∆ > 0 or F ∗ > wout, and hence
the eﬃcient profit-sharing contract is not optimal.
The argument here is that for risk-averse workers, the optimal profit-share ratio
is derived as a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and risk-sharing. To see this in a more
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general case consider the following analogous equation to (22) for the risk-averse case,
which defines the optimal wage contract w(x) as one which maximises with the choice
of x,
Eπ =
Z ∞
0
(φR− woutN) f(φ)dφ−
n
CE −
³
wout −
r
2
V ar[w]
´o
N c
such that CE = CEres (30)
where CEres corresponds to the certainty equivalent representation of EUres. The
CE constraint again requires the wage contract to be feasible. (30) reflects the fact
that it is costly for the firm to employ a higher variance wage contract as the workers
need to be compensated for the variability with higher expected average income. The
optimal wage contract is then one that satisfies,
dEπ
dx
=
Z ∞
0
dN
dx
d
dN
(φR− woutN)f(φ)dφ−
r
2
dV ar[w]
dx
= 0 (31)
For dV ar[w]dx 6= 0 this implies that φR0 6= wout, i.e. the optimal wage contracts are in
general not eﬃcient. However,
Corollary 3 For risk-averse workers the eﬃcient full insurance contract is the opti-
mal wage contract in the set of all contracts Ω.
Proof. The full insurance contract is where the firm pays a bonus payment BNc
which is independent of the market shock φ to all workers including those laid-oﬀ,
w =
⎧
⎨
⎩
F + BNc , if in-work
B
Nc , if out-of-work
(32)
The firm’s the marginal cost of an extra worker is then F , and the contract is eﬃcient
when F = wout. As the bonus payment is independent of φ, and the workers receive
the same income whether in or out of work, this wage income has zero variance.
Therefore the optimal wage contract given by (31) would again be the eﬃcient one,
and moreover the firm’s expected profit in (30) is the maximum of all contracts
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for given CEres. Hence the eﬃcient full insurance contract is optimal of all wage
contracts.
3.2 Variable Eﬀort Supply
We do not, however, observe full-insurance contracts. Apart from the credibility
problem where firms do not have an incentive to pay bonuses to laid-oﬀ workers,
there is a problem of worker incentives. Up until now I have assumed fixed eﬀort
supply by the hired workers. However if workers can choose their eﬀort levels, and
eﬀort exertion is costly, then they clearly do not have an incentive to provide any
eﬀort at all under full insurance. This means that in (30), whilst the full-insurance
contract is still “eﬃcient” in terms of allocation of workers, it is no longer optimal.
There are two ways firms can tackle this incentive problem associated with vari-
able eﬀort levels. The first is to make unemployment costly. Then as argued by
the eﬃciency wage literature initiated by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), taking into
account the probability of being caught workers exert just enough eﬀort so as to
be indiﬀerent between shirking and not shirking. A formal treatment of this in my
single-period set-up is diﬃcult as by assumption here workers cannot be sacked and
replaced instantaneously. However in the understanding that this model is a sim-
plified representation of a multi-period labour market, one can make the following
modification for the firms’ revenues R(.) and worker eﬀort levels E,
R ≡ R(EN) where E = e (δw) (33)
where δw is the diﬀerence between a worker’s incomes in and out of work including
the unemployment benefit wout, and e0 > 0. If by normalisation we assume e(0) = 0,
then to get any positive revenue we would require the wage variance V ar[w] to be
positive. This immediately rejects the full-insurance contract as a viable contract.
The optimal wage contract would then be one that maximises (30) subject to (33).
The second way to tackle the incentive problem is to use performance-related
wage contracts. When the worker eﬀort levels are unobservable and the individual
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output is subjected to production uncertainty, this is a well established result in the
large body of incentives literature including Salanié (1997) and Prendergast (1999).
However even in the absence of production uncertainty as assumed in this paper,
costly eﬀorts would mean that a remuneration related to performance would enhance
productivity, as argued by Weitzman (1995). Whilst recognising that when individual
output is unobservable, a wage related to aggregate performance is not the most
eﬀective tool for incentivising higher eﬀorts,2 Weitzman quotes Kruse’s (1993) survey
of 26 econometric studies which shows that of 265 estimated coeﬃcients measuring
the eﬀects of profit-sharing on productivity, 91.7 percent of the estimates are positive,
with 51.7 percent having t-statistics greater than +2. Moreover Kruse’s own study
shows that “profit-sharing adoption is associated with productivity increases of 3.5
to 5 percent”. Weitzman concludes then that “there appears to be a very strong
statistical association between profit sharing an productivity”. Here then the model
can be extended to incorporate this by making the eﬀort level exerted by workers
remaining at a firm be determined by,
E = argmax w − C(E) (34)
where C(E) is the monetary value of eﬀort disutility, with C 0, C 00 > 0. The optimal
wage contract this time is one that maximises (30) subject to (34). In both this
case and the eﬃciency wage case above then the optimal wage contract is one which
provides the optimal trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency, risk-sharing and incentives.
Under variable eﬀort supply then, which wage contract is the most appropriate
for this? To explore this further it is useful to decompose the wage income variance
2For example Holmström (1982) states, “... moral hazard problems may occur even when there is
no uncertainty in output. The reason is that agents who cheat cannot be identified if joint output is
the only observable indicator of inputs.” Weitzman (1995) however uses the repeated games argument
to reason that even in this case, a high productivity Nash equilibrium can be attained.
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V ar[w] in (27) into two separate terms,
V ar[w] =
Z ∞
0
½µ
N(φ)
N c
¶
w2 +
µ
1− N(φ)
N c
¶
w2out
¾
f(φ)dφ− (Ew)2
=
Z ∞
0
∙½µ
N(φ)
Nc
¶
w2 +
µ
1− N(φ)
N c
¶
w2out
¾
− (ENw)2
¸
f(φ)dφ
+
Z ∞
0
(ENw)
2 f(φ)dφ− (Ew)2
= EV arN [w] + V ar [ENw] (35)
where ENw is given by (4), and V arN [.] is the variance operator for the Bernoulli
distribution with probabilities
n
Ni(φ)
Nci
, 1− Ni(φ)Nci
o
, i.e.
V arN [w] =
µ
N(φ)
N c
¶
(w −ENw)2 +
µ
1− N(φ)
N c
¶
(wout −ENw)2 (36)
What this is stating is that the wage income variance is a sum of the average variance
of the ex-post wage income, and the variance of the expected ex-post wage income,
where ex-post here refers to the post-shock but pre-employment adjustment state.
The question is when allowing positive income variance to counter incentives problem,
which of the two components is the more eﬀective tool to use. To see this consider
first the fixed aggregate-bonus contract suggested in (24),
w(φ) = F +
B
N(φ)
The expected ex-post wage income of this contract calculated using (4) is,
ENw(φ) = ∆
N(φ)
Nc
+
B
N c
+ wout (37)
and therefore its variance is,
var[ENw] =
µ
∆
N c
¶2
var[N(φ)]
which equals zero for the eﬃcient contract F = wout. Thus the wage variance for
the eﬃcient fixed aggregate-bonus scheme comes solely from the ex-post wage income
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variance, i.e. employment uncertainty. This suggests that this contract would be
most eﬀective in providing incentives under the eﬃciency wage argument. However
due to its non-dependence on the firm’s performance, it is still prone to moral hazard
issues when eﬀort levels are unobservable.
Consider on the other hand the following contract where the firm pays a profit-
sharing bonus payment to both in-work and laid-oﬀ workers,
w =
⎧
⎨
⎩
F + λ
³
φR−FN
N
´
, if in-work
λ
³
φR−FN
N
´
, if out-of-work
(38)
An example of this kind of wage contract may be one where firms transfer excess
workers to their subsidiaries while making up the wage diﬀerences. The extreme case
is the life-time employment contract where F → 0. The eﬃcient contract for this
unemployment-insurance profit-sharing bonus scheme clearly has no wage variance
once the product market demand shock is realised, i.e. V arN [w] = 0. However ex-
ante the expected wage income is subject to product market demand uncertainty and
hence V ar [ENw] > 0. This contract thus provides incentives through performance-
dependence of the wage contract, whilst having no eﬃciency wage eﬀect.
The profit-sharing contract is then the compromise between these two extreme
cases. It provides worker incentives through both eﬃciency wage argument and
performance-related remuneration, allowing a more eﬀective trade-oﬀ between eﬃ-
ciency, risk-sharing and incentives. This gives a strong case for profit-sharing con-
tracts, more so than the traditional advocacy on the ground of higher employment
stability.
4 Concluding Remarks
In concluding this paper I return to my experience with the Japanese bank. My salary
there consisted of two components, a fixed salary and bi-annual bonus payments.
The bonus payments, at least for us younger cohorts, were independent of individual
performance, but varied according to the firm’s aggregate performance, albeit with
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stickiness. This variable component could be as much as a third of my annual income.
To our understanding then the wage contract was very much a profit-sharing contract.
Although at the time life-time employment was a predominant practice for large
Japanese firms, by mid-1990s many workers began to receive calls from headhunters
oﬀering jobs at foreign banks. These invariably oﬀered no employment guarantee but
a much higher salary. Although this could partially be because the targeted workers
were of higher-ability - Japanese workers in their first 10 to 15 years were paid similar
wages depending mostly on their age - the decision these workers had to make was
a trade-oﬀ between higher wages and employment stability. The result of this paper
indicates that if the workers are indiﬀerent between the two oﬀers, the firm oﬀering the
profit-sharing contract should expect a higher average profit, by a margin equivalent
to the surplus gained from the increased employment stability for the workers. This
was shown to be a result of an application of the Envelope Theorem. Indeed for
risk-neutral workers the expected profit is maximised with eﬃcient wage contracts,
for which feasibility was carefully established.
In practice though the fixed-wage component of our wages in the bank were never
as low as the unemployment benefit. However this can be explained by the extension
of the model to risk-averse workers and variable eﬀort supply, where the optimal wage
contract was shown to be determined as a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency, risk-sharing and
incentives. The profit-sharing scheme was once again argued to be the appropriate
tool, both for its feasibility and its ability to provide eﬀort incentives through both
the eﬃciency wage argument and the performance-related payout.
So then if it is beneficial for firms to be oﬀering profit-sharing contracts, as large
Japanese firms were, why were foreign firms oﬀering diﬀerent types of wage contracts?
The answer may lie once again with the eﬀort incentive problem. Although as already
discussed the incentive eﬀect of a profit-sharing contract is supported by some em-
pirical evidence cited in Weitzman (1995), one can still argue that contracts that pay
according to aggregate performance is prone to what is often termed the ‘ 1n -problem’.
This is where if the workers’ individual outputs were aﬀected by a random factor,
and their eﬀort levels were unobservable by the firm, paying an equal share of the
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aggregate profit in a non-cooperative setting would lead to all workers exerting sub-
optimal eﬀort levels. This is due to the fact that whilst in shirking a worker gains from
saving on his disutility from work, the eﬀect of this on his remuneration is diluted by
a factor of n. The problem worsens as n gets larger. The wage contracts oﬀered to us
potential recruits head-hunted by foreign firms typically included a possibility of an
individual-performance bonus payouts, which can be designed to alleviate this asym-
metric information problem (see for example Prendergast (1999)).3 The analysis of
the optimal wage contract under both market demand and production uncertainties
will be addressed in future studies.
3 It can be argued that the Japanese firms tackled this problem in ways other than design of
wage contracts, such as small-team based performance evaluation and centrally controlled promotion
schemes. The former would strengthen monitoring within the team, while the latter would discourage
shirking much in the way analysed in the tournament theory literature initiated by Lazaer and Rosen
(1981).
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A Feasibility of Eﬃcient Profit-Sharing Contract for Risk-
Averse Workers
First the analogous equation to (16) for the binding participation constraint (PC2)
is,
dF
dλ
= − ∂EU
∂λ
Á
dEU
dF
(39)
The numerator is unambiguously positive as, using (25),
∂EU
∂λ
=
r
N c
Z ∞
0
(φR− FN) e−rwf(φ)dφ > 0 ∀F (40)
On the other hand the denominator is again a sum of a positive and a negative term
as, in expanding dEUdF ,
dEU
dF
=
∂EU
∂F
+E
∙
dN(φ)
dF
∂ENU
∂N
¸
(41)
where ENU is the post-shock, pre-employment adjustment expected utility,
ENU = −
µ
N(φ)
N c
¶
e−rw −
µ
1− N(φ)
N c
¶
e−rwout (42)
and the two partial derivatives are given by,
∂EU
∂F
= r(1− λ)
Z ∞
0
N
N c
e−rwf(φ)dφ > 0 ∀λ < 1 (43)
∂ENU
∂N
= − 1
Nc
∙½
1 + rλ
µ
φR− FN
N
¶¾
e−rw − e−rwout
¸
(44)
> − 1
Nc
n
erλ(
φR−FN
N )e−rw − e−rwout
o
= − 1
Nc
¡
e−rF − e−rwout
¢
≥ 0 ∀F ≥ wout
These reflect the fact that increases in the fixed-wage component or the employment
probability both increase the workers’ expected utility. It is the fact that the increase
in F reduces the employment probability that makes it diﬃcult to assess the net
eﬀect. To see that this eﬀect is always positive for the contracts we are interested,
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once again investigate the graphs of EU(F ) for diﬀerent values of λ,
EU(F ) = −
Z ∞
0
½µ
N(φ)
Nc
¶³
e−r{F+λ(φR−FNN )} − e−rwout
´¾
f(φ)dφ− e−rwout (45)
For λ = 0, this equals −e−rwout when F = wout. At the other extreme when F →∞,
N(φ)→ 0 and henceEU asymptotically approaches−e−rwout from above for all values
of λ. To see what happens in the middle consider its derivative (41) at F = wout.
Using (43) and (44) in (41),
dEU
dF
¯¯¯¯
F=wout
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∂EU
∂F
¯¯
F=wout
> 0 at λ = 0
E
∙
dN(φ)
dF
∂ENU
∂N
¯¯¯
F=wout
¸
< 0 as λ→ 1
(46)
Therefore the graphs look something like this:
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wout 
 EUmax × × EU=EUres 
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outrwe−−  
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A BC 
Figure 3: EU vs. F for diﬀerent values of λ
Once again as ∂EU∂λ > 0 for any given F (c.f. (40)), the curve shifts upwards as λ
increases. One major diﬀerence between this and the risk-neutral case in Figure 2 is
that with risk-neutral workers, the slope of EU(F ) at F = wout turns negative as λ
approaches 1. This is because compared with (18), risk-averse workers derive negative
utility from the increase in the wage income variance that results from an increase in
F . This more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of increasing wage-level on the worker utility at
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higher λ. Now what we require to prove feasibility is that as the firm trades oﬀ F
with λ from the optimal fixed-wage contract at A (note that once again the firm will
choose the lower F solution, and hence not point B), to the eﬃcient profit-sharing
contract at C, the slope of the curve remains positive at the participation constraint
solutions (i.e. where the horizontal EU = EUres line intersects the EU(F ) curves).
If this is not the case then dFdλ in (39) would be positive, which contradicts the F − λ
trade-oﬀ process. With risk-neutral workers this was always the case as the slope dEUdF
was positive at F = wout for all values of λ. Here a suﬃcient condition that the slope
is still positive at C is that EUres ≤ EUmax, where EUmax is the highest achievable
expected utility with a fixed-wage contract. Thus if the fixed-wage contract is feasible,
then so is the eﬃcient profit-sharing contract. ¥
B Discussion on the Derivatives of V ar[w]
As discussed in the text, as well as its direct eﬀect, a change in λ has secondary and
tertiary eﬀects on V ar[w] through its eﬀects on F and N(φ), (with a slight abuse of
notation)
dV ar[w]
dλ
=
∂V ar[w]
∂λ
+
dF
dλ
µ
∂V ar[w]
∂F
+
dN
dF
∂V ar[w]
∂N
¶
(47)
Then,
Claim 1 dV ar[w]dλ is positive at F = wout for all values of λ.
Proof. First consider the fixed-wage λ = 0. Then at F = wout, w = wout and
hence V ar[w] = 0. As any increase in λ results in a positive variance, dV ar[w]dλ
¯¯¯
F=wout
for λ = 0 must be greater than zero. Next consider the case λ→ 1. As discussed in
the main text ∂V ar[w]∂λ > 0 as an increase in λ increases the size of the variable part of
the wage. ∂V ar[w]∂F is also greater than zero as a rise in F increases the level of w and
hence its dispersion from wout.4
∂V ar[w]
∂N is however a sum of positive and negative
4 It can be shown that for a profit-sharing contract (6),
∂V ar[w]
∂λ
=
2
Nc(1− λ) {Cov [ENw, π] + wπ}
∂V ar[w]
∂F
=
2(1− λ)
Nc
{Cov [ENw,N ] +wN}
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terms, as higher N(φ) both increases the dispersion of w from wout from the increased
probability of being paid the higher in-work wage, and decreases the in-work wage
variance as it reduces the share of the aggregate profit. However at F = wout and
large λ the second eﬀect dominates, and hence at this point ∂V ar[w]∂N < 0.
5 As dNdF < 0
then, dV ar[w]dF =
∂V ar[w]
∂F +
∂N
∂F
∂V ar[w]
∂N is positive. However it was discussed in Appendix
A eqn (46) that at F = wout the slope of EU(F ) turns negative as λ approaches 1.
In other words dFdλ turns positive for large λ. Hence
dV ar[w]
dλ in (47) is again positive
at large λ. Thus I claim that dV ar[w]dλ
¯¯¯
F=wout
> 0 for all values of λ ∈ [0, 1].
which are both unambiguously positive.
5Again for a profit-sharing contract it can be shown that, with a slight abuse of notation,
∂V ar[w]
∂N
=
1
Nc
+
−λ2

φR− FN
N
2
+

F 2 −w2out

,
For F = wout then, this is unambiguously negative.
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